Non-trivial two-armed partial-monitoring games are bandits by Antos, András et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
10
8.
49
61
v1
  [
cs
.L
G]
  2
4 A
ug
 20
11
Non-trivial two-armed partial-monitoring games are bandits
Andra´s Antos
Computer and Automation
Research Institute
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Ga´bor Barto´k and Csaba Szepesva´ri
Department of Computing Science
University of Alberta
Edmonton, Canada
Abstract
We consider online learning in partial-monitoring games against an oblivious adversary.
We show that when the number of actions available to the learner is two and the game is
nontrivial then it is reducible to a bandit-like game and thus the minimax regret is Θ(
√
T ).
1 Introduction
The partial-monitoring games we consider are defined as follows: Two players interact with each
other in a sequential manner, Learner and Nature. In each time step Learner can choose one of N
actions, while Nature can choose one of M actions. We use the notation n = {1, . . . , n} for any
integer and denote the actions of both players by integers, starting from 1, so the action sets are N
and M . At the beginning of the game both Learner and Nature are given a pair of N ×M matrices,
G = (L,H), where L is the loss matrix and H is the feedback matrix. The elements ℓij of L are
real numbers and in fact we shall assume that they belong to the [0, 1] interval. The elements hij
of H could be chosen from any alphabet. However, for the sake of simplicity, and without loss of
generality (w.l.o.g.), we may assume that the elements of H are also real numbers. Now, still at
the beginning of the game, Nature decides about the sequence of actions (J1, J2, . . .) to be played.
These actions are kept private, i.e., they are not revealed to Learner. Nature’s actions will also be
called outcomes.
The game is played in discrete time steps. At time step t (t = 1, 2, . . .), first Learner chooses
an action It based on the information available to him up to time t. The choice of the action may
be randomized. Upon announcing his action, Learner gets the feedback hIt,Jt and suffers the loss
ℓIt,Jt . The cycle is then repeated for time step t + 1. It is important to note that the loss suffered
is not revealed to Learner.
The goal of Learner is to keep his cumulative loss
LT =
T∑
t=1
ℓIt,Jt
small, where T denotes the time horizon. Learner’s performance is evaluated by comparing his
cumulative loss to the cumulative loss of the best fixed action from N ,
L∗T = min
i∈N
T∑
t=1
ℓi,Jt ,
giving rise to the cumulative expected regret (or simply regret),
RT (A,G) = E [LT − L∗T ] ,
where A is the strategy Learner follows. Note that in the definition of L∗T , the best fixed action
is selected in hindsight. When the growth rate of regret is sublinear in T , i.e., the average regret
RT /T converges to zero, in the long run, Learner can be said to perform as well as an oracle who
can play this best action in hindsight.
The problem just described is of major importance in learning theory since it models a number
of interesting scenarios including apple tasting [Barto´k et al., 2010], a variant of label efficient pre-
diction, and dynamic pricing [Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006]. For further discussion and examples
see Chapters 2–7 in the book by Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006].
Given a gameG = (L,H), our goal is to find out the growth rate of the minimax regret associated
with G, and to design strategies that allow Learner to achieve this minimal growth rate. Let the
worst-case regret of algorithm A when used in G for time horizon T be
R¯T (A,G) = sup
(J1,...,JT )∈MT
RT (A,G),
where the supremum is taken over all outcome sequences. Formally, the minimax regret of game G
for time horizon T is defined by
R∗T (G) = inf
A
R¯T (A,G) = inf
A
sup
(J1,...,JT )∈MT
RT (A,G),
where the infimum is taken over all strategies of Learner. Note that, since for constant outcome
sequences RT (A,G) ≥ 0, also R¯T (A,G) ≥ 0 and R∗T (G) ≥ 0.
Definition 1 A game is called trivial if the minimax regret is either 0 or scales linearly with the
number of time steps.
Lemma 1 The following three statements are equivalent:
a) The minimax regret is zero for each T .
b) The minimax regret is zero for some T .
c) There exists an action i ∈ N whose loss is not larger than the loss of any other action irrespectively
of the choice of Nature’s action.
The proof is in the Appendix.
2 Previous work
The growth rate of the minimax regret is strongly influenced by the choice of L andH. Consider, for
example, the case of so-called full-information games, where the feedback is sufficient for Learner to
recover Nature’s action in each round. In the simplest case, this is represented by hij = j. However,
from the point of view of the information content of feedback, we get an equivalent situation when
each row of H is composed of pairwise distinct elements. The following result is known to hold for
these games:
Theorem 2 Consider a full-information game G when Learner has N actions. Then there exists
an algorithm A such that for any time horizon T , R¯T (A,G) ≤
√
(T/2) lnN .
Algorithm A in the theorem above can be the Exponentially Weighted Average Forecaster with
appropriate tuning (see e.g., Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006, Corollary 4.2]).
Another special case is when the only information that Learner receives is the loss of the ac-
tion taken (i.e., when H = L), which we call the bandit case, following Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
[2006]. Then, the INF algorithm due to Audibert and Bubeck [2009] is known to achieve a constant
multiple of the minimax regret:
Theorem 3 Take a bandit game G when Learner has N actions. Then there exists an algorithm
A such that R¯T (A,G) ≤ 15
√
NT . Further, for any N there exists a game G such that for any time
horizon T , R∗T (G) ≥ 1/20
√
NT .
The lower bound on the minimax regret is due to Auer et al. [2002] (also, Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi
[2006, Theorem 6.11]), while the upper bound is due to Audibert and Bubeck [2009]. (The Exp3
algorithm due to Auer et al. [2002] achieves the same upper bound up to logarithmic factors.)
The following theorem, due to Antos et al. [2011], is a lower bound for any non-trivial game.
Theorem 4 If G is a non-trivial partial-monitoring game then there exists a constant c > 0 such
that for any T , R∗T (G) ≥ c
√
T .
Now, consider the game G = (L,H) with
L =
(
1 1
0 1
1 0
)
, H =
(
1 2
1 1
1 1
)
. (1)
That is, the first action of Learner gives full information about the outcome, but it has a high cost,
while the other two actions do not reveal any information. Further, the ordering of actions 2 and 3
by costs is reversed based on the choice of Nature. Then, the following holds [Cesa-Bianchi et al.,
2006, Theorem 5.1]:
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Theorem 5 The above game has R∗T (G) = Ω(T
2/3).
This shows that the above game is intrinsically harder than a bandit problem. Further, the
algorithm FeedExp3 by Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001] is known to achieve this growth-rate
[Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2006]:
Theorem 6 Consider any partial-monitoring game G = (L,H) such that L = KH for some matrix
K. Then, there exist an algorithm A such that R¯T (A,G) ≤ CT 2/3, where C depends on N and
k∗
def
= maxi,j |kij |.
Thus, we see that the difficulty of a game depends on the structure of L and H. Recently,
Barto´k et al. [2010] classified almost all games by their difficulty when the number of actions available
to Nature is limited to M = 2. In effect, they showed that the exponent in the dependence of the
minimax regret on T in these games is one of {0, 1/2, 2/3, 1}.
In this short communication, we investigate the dual case when the number of actions available
to Nature is not restricted, but the number of actions available to Learner is limited to N = 2.
3 Result
In this section we state and prove that, in essence, any non-trivial two-action game can be viewed
as a bandit game.
We need some preparations. First, we will make use of the following concept:
Definition 2 Take two games, G = (L,H), G′ = (L′,H′), where L, L′, H, and H′ are N ×M
matrices. We say that G′ is simulation-and-regret-not-harder than G (or easier for short, denoted
by G′ ≤ G) when the following holds: Fix any algorithm A. Then, one can find an algorithm A′
such that the behavior of A on G can be replicated by using A′ on G′ in the sense that for the same
outcome sequences, the two algorithms will choose the same action sequences and the regret in the
second case is at most the regret in the first case, that is, RT (A′,G′) ≤ RT (A,G).
We say that G and G′ are simulation-and-regret-equivalent (or equivalent, G′ ≃G) when both
G′ ≤ G and G ≤ G′.
Clearly, ≤ is a preorder and ≃ is an equivalence relation on the set of N ×M games, moreover,
if G′ ≤G then R∗T (G′) ≤ R∗T (G), and if G ≃ G′ then their minimax regret is the same.
We need a few simple lemmata on these relations of games:
Lemma 7 The regret of a sequence of actions in a game does not change if the loss matrix is
changed by subtracting the same real number from each coordinate of one of its columns (see e.g.,
Piccolboni and Schindelhauer [2001]). Therefore, letting 1 = (1, . . . , 1)⊤ ∈ RN , v ∈ RM , and
G′ = (L− 1v⊤,H), we have that G ≃G′.
Lemma 8 If G = (L,H) and G′ = (L,H′) differ only in their feedback matrices and H′ can be
obtained by h′ij = fi(hij) with the help of some mappings fi (i ∈ N) then G ≤ G′. If each fi is
injective then G ≃G′.
In what follows, a transformation of some game into another game that takes either the first or
the second form just defined shall be called an admissible transformation.
The following proposition shows that if a 2-armed partial-monitoring game is non-trivial then
there is no loss in generality by assuming that L = KH for someK ∈ R2×2. This statement for arbi-
traryN and most of the ideas for its proof could be extracted from the paper of Piccolboni and Schindelhauer
[2001]. An exact detailed proof for N = 2 is included here for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 1 Let G0 = (L0,H0) be a non-trivial 2-armed partial-monitoring game. Then, there
exist matrices L,H ∈ R2×M such that G0 ≤ G = (L,H) and L = KH for some K ∈ R2×2.
Proof:[Proof of Proposition 1] First, we transform L0 to L using Lemma 7 with v
⊤ being its first row.
Thus, the first row of L becomes identically zero, and we get a non-trivial gameG1 = (L,H0) ≃ G0.
Let ℓ denote the transpose of the second row of L. In what follows we construct the matrix H using
an admissible transformation of H0 defined in Lemma 8.
We construct matrix A in the following way. Assume that there are m1 (m2) distinct entries in
the first (respectively, second) row of H0, and transform H0 by two injective mappings (Lemma 8)
such that the elements of its ith row (i ∈ 2) are from mi. We define the matrices Ai ∈ Rmi×M as
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H0 =
(
1 2 3 1
1 2 2 2
)
−→ A =


1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1


Figure 1: An example for the construction of matrix A used in the proof of Proposition 1. The
first three rows of A are constructed from the first row of H0 which has three distinct elements, the
remaining two rows are constructed from the second row of H0. For more details, see the text.
follows: Let each row of Ai be the “indicator” row of the corresponding value of the i
th row of H0,
that is, [Ai]jk
def
= I{[H0]ik=j}. Define A by stacking these matrices on top of each other:
A =
(
A1
A2
)
.
See Figure 1 for an example.
The following lemma, proven in the Appendix, is key to prove Proposition 1.
Lemma 9 If ℓ 6∈ ImA⊤ then G1 is trivial.
Using the assumption that G1 is non-trivial, we have from Lemma 9 that ℓ ∈ ImA⊤ must hold.
That is, ℓ can be written as a linear combination of the rows of A:
ℓ =
m∑
i=1
λiai,
where m = m1 +m2 and the vectors a
⊤
i are the rows of A. Let
h1 =
m1∑
i=1
λiai and h2 =
m∑
i=m1+1
λiai.
Finally, let
H =
(
h⊤1
h⊤2
)
andG = (L,H). Now if the kth and k′th entries of the first row ofH0 are identical then [ai]k = [ai]k′
for 1 ≤ i ≤ m1, hence also [h1]k = [h1]k′ . The same holds for the second row of H0 and h2. Thus,
H can be obtained by appropriate mappings from H0, and Lemma 8 implies G1 ≤ G.
On the other hand, setting
K =
(
0 0
1 1
)
, (2)
we have that L = KH.
The following Proposition is more than what we need, but it is interesting in itself:
Proposition 2 Let G = (L,H) be a 2-armed partial-monitoring game such that L = KH for some
K ∈ R2×2. Then, there exist a 2×M bandit game G′ such that G ≤ G′. If K is given by (2) then
G ≃ G′.
Proof: We will construct a bandit gameG′ = (L′,H′) ≥G that satisfies L′ = H′. Let K = [kij ]2×2
and
D = diag(k11 − k21, k22 − k12)
be a 2× 2 diagonal matrix, and define the feedback matrix of G′ by H′ = DH. Then, both rows of
H′ are scalar multiples of the corresponding rows of H. Hence, by these mappings and Lemma 8,
G ≤ (L,H′). If K is given by (2) then D = diag(−1, 1), thus both mappings are injective and
G ≃ (L,H′). On the other hand, K−D = 1k⊤ where k⊤ = (k21, k12). Consider the loss matrix
L′
def
= L− 1(k⊤H).
By Lemma 7, G′ = (L′,H′) ≃ (L,H′). Moreover,
L′ = L− (1k⊤)H = L− (K−D)H = DH = H′.
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Remark 1 It is worth to consider why the above proof works only for N = 2. We used that from
any 2× 2 matrix K we can subtract a diagonal matrix resulting in a matrix with identical rows. For
N ≥ 3, this obviously does not hold (there is not enough “degrees of freedom”). Indeed, for N ≥ 3,
we have regret rates between Θ(
√
T ) and Θ(T ), for example, Theorem 5 and 6 show that the game
in (1) has minimax regret rate Θ(T 2/3).
Now, we are ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 10 Each non-trivial 2-armed partial-monitoring game is easier than an appropriate 2×M
bandit game. Consequently, its minimax regret is Θ(
√
T ), where T is the number of time steps.
Proof: According to Proposition 1 and 2, ifG0 is non-trivial then we can construct firstG = (L,H)
such that L = KH and G0 ≤ G, then a 2×M bandit game G′ such that G ≤ G′. Thus G0 ≤ G′,
that implies R∗T (G0) ≤ R∗T (G′) = O(
√
T ) by Theorem 3, finishing the proof.
Appendix
Proof:[Proof of Lemma 1] a)→b) is obvious
b)→c) For any A,
sup
(J1,...,JT )∈MT
RT (A,G) ≥ sup
j∈M,J1=···=JT=j
E [LT − L∗T ]
= sup
j∈M
E
[
T∑
t=1
ℓIt,j − T min
i∈N
ℓij
]
≥ sup
j∈M
(
E [ℓI1,j]−min
i∈N
ℓij
)
def
= f(A).
b) leads to
0 = R∗T (G) = inf
A
sup
(J1,...,JT )∈MT
RT (A,G) ≥ inf
A
f(A).
Observe that f(A) depends on A through only the distribution of I1 on N denoted by q = q(A)
now, that is, f(A) = f ′(q). This dependence is continuous on the compact domain of q, hence the
infimum can be replaced by minimum. Thus minq f
′(q) ≤ 0, that is, there is a q that for all j ∈M ,
E [ℓI1,j] = mini∈N ℓij . This implies that the support of q contains only actions whose loss is not
larger than the loss of any other action irrespectively of the choice of Nature’s action.
c)→a) The algorithm that always plays i has zero regret for all outcome sequences and T .
Proof:[Proof of Lemma 9] ℓ /∈ ImA⊤ implies 〈ℓ〉 * ImA⊤, that is equivalent to ℓ⊥ + KerA, which
can be seen by taking the orthogonal complement of both sides and using (KerA)⊥ = ImA⊤. The
latter implies that there exists v such that v ∈ KerA but ℓ⊤v 6= 0. We may assume w.l.o.g. that
ℓ⊤v > 0 (otherwise take −v). Note that, since the first m1 rows of A add up to 1 and v ∈ KerA,
the coordinates of v sum to zero.
Let ∆M ⊆ RM denote the M -dimensional probability simplex. If p ∈ ∆M is a distribution over
Nature’s actions M , then it is easy to see that the first m1 coordinates of Ap give the probability
distribution of observing the different values of the first row of H0 while Learner chooses action 1
assuming Nature chooses her actions from p. The same applies to the last m2 coordinates of Ap and
action 2. It follows that if Ap1 = Ap2 for two distributions then no algorithm can distinguish them.
We find such p1, p2 and apply this idea as follows:
If for all p ∈ ∆M , ℓ⊤p ≥ 0 (or ℓ⊤p ≤ 0), then G1 has zero minimax regret and thus it is
trivial. Otherwise, there exist p+ and p− with ℓ
⊤p+ > 0 and ℓ
⊤p− < 0. Now either there exists
p0 ∈ Int(∆M ) such that ℓ⊤p0 = 0, or we can assume w.l.o.g. that one of p+ and p− is in Int(∆M ),
in which case there must be again a p0 ∈ Int(∆M ) on the segment p+p− such that ℓ⊤p0 = 0 by the
continuity of ℓ⊤p in p. In other words, we have a distribution p0 over M such that p0 is not on the
boundary of the probability simplex and the expected loss of the two actions are equal.
Now let p1 = p0 + εv and p2 = p0 − εv for some ε > 0. If ε is small enough then both p1 and p2
are on the probability simplex ∆M . Since Av = 0 we have that Ap1 = Ap2.
Given a p ∈ ∆M , we use randomization such that J1, . . . , JT is replaced by a vector J˜1, . . . , J˜T ∈
MT of i.i.d. random variables distributed according to p, independent of the randomization in the
algorithm. Let A be an arbitrary strategy of Learner. For k ∈ 2, given that the outcome distribution
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is pk, let Pk[·] be the probability of an event and Ek[·] be the expectation of a random variable. Then
the worst case regret of A is
sup
(J1,...,JT )∈MT
RT (A,G1) ≥ Ek[RT (A,G1)]
= Ek
[
T∑
t=1
ℓIt,J˜t −mini∈2
T∑
t=1
ℓi,J˜t
]
= Ek
[
T∑
t=1
I{It=2}ℓJ˜t −min
(
T∑
t=1
ℓJ˜t , 0
)]
(ℓ1j = 0, ℓ2j = ℓj)
≥
T∑
t=1
Ek
[
I{It=2}
]
EkℓJ˜t −min
(
T∑
t=1
EkℓJ˜t , 0
)
(by the independence of It and J˜t, and Jensen’s inequality for min)
=
T∑
t=1
Pk[It = 2]ℓ
⊤pk +
(
−
T∑
t=1
ℓ⊤pk
)+
= ℓ⊤pkµTk + T (−ℓ⊤pk)+,
where
µTk = µTk(A) def=
T∑
t=1
Pk[It = 2] ∈ [0, T ]
is the expected number of times A chooses action 2 under pk up to time T . Observe that Ap1 = Ap2
means that for both actions, the feedback distribution is the same under outcome distributions
p1 and p2, implying (by induction) that for each t ≥ 1, P1[It = 2] = P2[It = 2]. This leads to
µT1 = µT2
def
= µT = µT (A). Moreover, using ℓ⊤p0 = 0 and ℓ⊤v > 0,
ℓ⊤pkµT + T (−ℓ⊤pk)+ =
{
εℓ⊤vµT if k = 1,
εℓ⊤v(T − µT ) if k = 2.
Thus we have
R∗T (G1) = inf
A
sup
(J1,...,JT )∈MT
RT (A,G1) ≥ inf
A
max
k∈2
(ℓ⊤pkµT + T (−ℓ⊤pk)+)
= εℓ⊤v inf
A
max(µT , T − µT ) ≥ εℓ⊤vT/2,
that is, G1 is trivial.
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